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1 Introduction
It is well understood that cartels are socially harmful. What is far less clear is the
magnitude of this harm. The seriousness of the cartel problem in an economy depends
on: 1) how many cartels there are; 2) how large is the overcharge (and the elasticity
of market demand); and 3) how long cartels last. Currently, what we know about
these issues comes from cartels which, to their disappointment, were discovered and
convicted. Other than that the number of discovered cartels is a lower bound on
the number of cartels, we know little about how many cartels there are.1 On the
issue of the overcharge, there is a fair amount of work estimating how much higher
is the price charged by discovered cartels. For surveys of those estimates, see Connor
and Bolotova (2006), Oxera (2009), Connor (2010), and Boyer and Kotchoni (2012).
Regarding the last factor - how long cartels last - the consensus measure of average
cartel duration is the average duration of discovered cartels which most studies find
to be 5-7 years.2
Cartel duration is not only relevant to assessing the severity of the cartel problem
but also to evaluating whether current levels of enforcement are suffi cient to deter
cartel formation. Some economists have expressed a lack of concern about cartels
on the premise that cartels are inherently unstable and thus, even if they form, they
will not be around for long. That is, of course, an empirical question. There is
also an active debate regarding whether penalties in some jurisdictions are too low
- so that there is under-deterrence of cartels - or too high - so that they are in
excess of what is necessary to deter and may be creating social costs. For example,
Connor and Lande (2012) argues that there is under-deterrence. In the case of the
1While this does not pertain to the question of how many cartels there are now, there is research
that addresses how many cartels there were when cartels were lawful. At various points in time,
Austria, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Norway, and Sweden permitted cartels but required that
they be registered with the government. For an analysis of the Finnish cartel registry, see Hyytinen,
Steen, and Toivanen (2013, 2014).
2Levenstein and Suslow (2006) summarize the findings of many studies on cartel duration.
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European Union, Boyer et al (2011) provides evidence against the under-deterrence
claim, though see Combe and Monnier (2011) for a different view.3 An evaluation
of the extent to which enforcement is either under- or over-deterring cartels depends
on the incremental profits earned from collusion, penalties in the event of discovery
and conviction, and the likelihood of discovery and conviction. Using data on the
duration of discovered cartels, these and other studies use an estimate of 15% per
year that a cartel is caught and convicted.4
In assessing the extent of the cartel problem and determining whether enforcement
should be strengthened or weakened, estimates of the average duration of discovered
cartels and the annual probability of discovery and conviction for discovered cartels
are useful only to the extent that they are reasonable proxies for the average duration
of all cartels (discovered and undiscovered) and the annual probability of discovery
and conviction for all cartels (discovered and undiscovered). The objective of this
paper is to explore to what extent they are reasonable proxies. Are estimates using
data on discovered cartels biased? If so, what is the direction and possible magnitude
of the bias?
Section 2 describes the stochastic process governing cartel birth, death, and dis-
covery. That theoretical construct is explored in Sections 3 and 4 to provide insight
into the sources of bias and how these sources affect the direction of bias. Contrary to
a common perception (for which we later provide references), we show that average
duration of discovered cartels need not be a biased measure of average cartel dura-
tion. In fact, if the empirical model used in previous studies is correctly specified then
3Also see Harrington (2014a) who argues that enforcement policy is more effective than is gen-
erally believed. For some reasons as to why we should not ease up on enforcement even if we think
penalties are in the over-deterrence region, see Harrington (2014b).
4For 184 convictions by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice over 1961-88,
Bryant and Eckard (1991) estimated the annual chances of of disovery and conviction to lie between
13 and 17%, while for 86 convictions by the European Commission over 1969-2007, Combe, Monnier,
and Legal (2008) estimated it to be around 13%.
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estimates are unbiased. That result is fairly intuitive and not particularly surprising.
Of greater value is showing how, under plausible assumptions, estimates based on
data using discovered cartels are likely to be biased and then characterizing when
average duration of discovered cartels is an over-estimate and when it is an under-
estimate of average cartel duration. In Section 5, this theoretical model is estimated
using data on discovered cartels and, applying Bayesian inference, we provide likely
bounds on the extent of bias. While there is evidence of bias, it proves to be modest
in magnitude. Finally, we deliver an estimate of the probability of cartel death that
takes into account this bias. A cartel has, on average, a 17% chance each year of
either collapsing and/or being discovered.
While the analysis is motivated by learning about cartels, the ensuing theoretical
and empirical analyses could be applicable to other forms of illegal conspiracy such
as drug gangs and counterfeiting rings. As long as they are subject to stochastic
death and discovery, the observed population of illegal conspiracies may be a biased
sample of all such conspiracies. The results derived in this paper could then shed
light on what one can infer from detected unlawful conspiracies about those that
avoid detection.
2 Model
There are generally recognized to be two primary reasons why the duration of dis-
covered cartels may be a biased measure of the duration of all cartels: measurement
error and sample selection bias. Cartel duration is measured as the time between a
cartel’s birth and its death. Cartel death is typically well-documented, though there
can be cases in which cartels remain active even after discovery.5 Far more prob-
lematic is dating the birth of a cartel. In most data sets, a cartel’s date of birth is
5There are some well-documented cases of post-conviction collusion in government procurement
auctions in Japan; see Kawai and Nakabayashi (2014).
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either the earliest time for which there is evidence of a cartel or is the product of
negotiation between the defendants and the competition authority. In either case, it
is reasonable to presume that offi cial cartel birth is no earlier than actual cartel birth
and, therefore, any bias from measurement error is likely to result in the duration of
discovered cartels’being an under-estimate.
In this paper, we will not address the issue of measurement error and instead
presume that the duration of discovered cartels is accurately measured. Our focus
is on characterizing selection bias associated with using the population of discovered
cartels to draw inferences about the population of cartels. In order to produce some
clean insight, the noise associated with finite samples is also not considered as it is
assumed there is an infinite number of industries of which some fraction are cartelized
out of which some fraction are discovered. We will then be characterizing what is
referred to as asymptotic bias which is the bias present with infinite samples.6
For a continuum of industries, assume there is a cartel birth process that is con-
stant over time so that, in each period, a mass of cartels are created, which is nor-
malized to one.7 Once cartelized, a cartel can "die" for natural reasons (due to a
change in market conditions or firm-specific factors so collusion is no longer stable)
or it can die because it has been detected and convicted by the competition authority
6An assumption made throughout the analysis is that we can only observe whether a cartel was
discovered but not whether, upon discovery, it was active or inactive. While that assumption fits
most empirical studies, such information is available in some instances; see De (2010) and Levenstein
and Suslow (2011). However, measurement issue is a concern. For example, suppose a customer
complained and firms learned about it which then caused the cartel to collapse. Thus, at the time a
formal investigation is opened up, the cartel would be inactive and one might be inclined to conclude
that the cartel collapsed and was then discovered but the reality is that discovery - in the form of
a customer complaint, not the formal investigation - caused the collapse and, therefore, the cartel
was actually active at the time of discovery.
7Allowing the birth process to be time-dependent (perhaps sensitive to the business cycle) is a
worthy extension but, at this stage, it would be counter-productive to gaining some initial insight
into selection bias.
5
(which, for brevity, will hereon be referred to as "discovery"). A cartel can then have
three possible terminal states: 1) it can die a natural death (which we refer to as "col-
lapse") and not be discovered; 2) it can collapse and be discovered; and 3) it can be
discovered (and thus die through conviction). The probability that a cartel collapses
in the current period is λ, the probability of discovery conditional on the cartel being
active in the current period is ρ, and the probability of discovery conditional on the
cartel just having collapsed in the current period is β. There are a variety of reasons
why the likelihood of discovery may depend on whether the cartel is still active or
has collapsed. For example, if customer complaints are triggered by suspicious price
movements then a sharp price decline associated with the cartel collapsing may trig-
ger discovery.8 However, the primary reason why we have allowed for this possible
dependence of discovery on the state of the cartel is to take account of leniency pro-
grams. A deterrent to a member of an active cartel to applying for leniency is that
it’ll cause the cartel to collapse and, as a result, the firm will forego future collusive
profits. However, if the cartel is no longer active then that cost disappears in which
case firms may then self-report.9 This would provide a rationale for β > ρ so that
cartel collapse makes discovery more likely. Alternatively, it could be the case that
β = ρ so the probability of discovery is the same whether the cartel is alive or just
died. At this stage, it is assumed: λ ∈ (0, 1) , ρ ∈ (0, 1) , β ∈ [0, 1] .
Studies that estimate the annual probability of discovery for discovered cartels -
such as Bryant and Eckard (1991) and Combe, Monnier, and Legal (2008) - specify
a constant hazard rate model. This is a continuous time model for which there is
a constant probability of being caught in any instant. The model of this paper is
a discrete time analogue in that the probabilities of death and discovery are also
8The implications for cartel pricing of having discovery depend on past prices is explored in
Harrington (2004, 2005).
9The birth and death of cartels is modeled in Harrington and Chang (2014) and, under the
assumption of full leniency, all dying cartels have firms racing for leniency which, for the current
model, means β = 1.
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constant over time. In addition, it is worth noting that results can be stated either in
terms of average cartel duration or the probability of death in that the former equals
the inverse of the latter. For example, an over-estimate of average cartel duration is
equivalent to an under-estimate of the probability of death.
Before moving on, let us note that the possibility of selection bias associated with
using data on discovered cartels is recognized, though different views have been ex-
pressed regarding the direction of bias. In the original study of Bryant and Eckard
(1991, pp. 535-536), it was suggested (though not presumed) that "the life of a caught
conspiracy is typically no longer than that of an uncaught conspiracy ... and [so] our
probability [of death] estimate is an upper bound." This suggestion that the proba-
bility of death is over-estimated was picked up more recently in Connor and Lande
(2012, pp. 462-463): "[a cartel’s probability of death] p is computed from samples of
discovered cartels. Founders of never-discovered cartels might rationally conjecture
a lower p. Thus, computed sizes of p may well overstate the actual average p for all
cartels." This direction to the bias is based on the presumption that if a cartel was
not caught then it would have survived longer and, therefore, the duration of discov-
ered cartels is less than that for undiscovered cartels. While those papers emphasize
that cartel duration is under-estimated, Levenstein and Suslow (2011, p. 463) believe
that cartel duration is over-estimated: "Because our sampling procedure relies on
antitrust prosecutions, it is less likely to capture very short lived cartels. These may
form and disappear without ever attracting the attention of the authorities. Thus,
as with most other samples of cartels, our estimates of cartel duration may be biased
upward relative to the universe of all cartels ever attempted."
In light of the disparity of views, the initial motivation for this project was to
rigorously examine the matter in order to inject some clarity. In Section 3, it is
assumed that all cartels are produced by the same process; that is, all cartels have the
same (λ, ρ, β) . Thus, cartels are ex ante the same but are ex post different because
they have different realizations of the death-discovery stochastic process. This is
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essentially the model that underlies studies like Bryant and Eckard (1991). We find,
contrary to the various views just expressed, there is no bias: average cartel duration
for discovered cartels equals average cartel duration. However, inferences drawn by
previous studies regarding the probability of discovery are mistaken. In Section 4, the
more reasonable assumption is made which is that cartels are governed by different
processes; that is, cartels can have different values for (λ, ρ, β). Now there is bias and
we investigate the determinants of the direction and size of the bias.
3 Cartels are Subject to the Same Death and Dis-
covery Process
Suppose a mass 1 of cartels are born each period and that has been true for the
infinite past; hence, the cartel population is in the steady-state. There is then a mass
of cartels that are born in the current period out of which (1− λ) ρ+λ die - a fraction
λ collapse and a fraction (1− λ) ρ do not collapse but are discovered and thus die -
and (1− λ) ρ + λβ are discovered - a fraction λβ collapse and are discovered and a
fraction (1− λ) ρ do not collapse and are discovered. Given that a cartel that died
with duration of one period must have experienced birth and death in the current
period (born at the start and died at the end) then the mass of cartels with duration
1 is (1− λ) ρ + λ. Analogously, the mass of cartels discovered with duration 1 is
(1− λ) ρ+ λβ.
Cartels with a duration of two periods must have been born one period ago,
survived for that period, and then died in the current period. With a mass 1 of cartels
born a period ago, a mass (1− λ) (1− ρ) of them survived to the current period -
they neither collapsed nor were discovered - and, of those, a fraction (1− λ) ρ+λ die
this period which implies there is a mass [(1− λ) ρ+ λ] (1− λ) (1− ρ) of cartels that
lasted two periods and, analogously, a mass [(1− λ) ρ+ λβ] (1− λ) (1− ρ) of cartels
that are discovered after two periods.
8
These values are shown in Table 1 along with values for other durations. Given
that all cartels eventually die, average cartel duration is just the sum of the numbers
in the column "Mass of cartels of duration t that died in the current period" with
each number weighted by the length of cartel duration:
∞∑
t=1
t [(1− λ) ρ+ λ] [(1− λ) (1− ρ)]t−1 = [(1− λ) ρ+ λ]
∞∑
t=1
t [(1− λ) (1− ρ)]t−1
= [(1− λ) ρ+ λ]
(
1
[(1− λ) ρ+ λ]2
)
=
1
λ+ ρ− λρ.
Average cartel duration is then (λ+ ρ− λρ)−1.
Next, let us turn to the average duration of discovered cartels which we will also
refer to as average discovery time (conditional on being discovered). Recognizing that
only a mass (1−λ)ρ+λβ
1−(1−λ)(1−ρ) of all cartels are discovered, average time until discovery is
the sum of the numbers in the column "Mass of cartels of duration t discovered in the
current period" divided by the total mass of discovered cartels with each weighted by
the length of duration:10
∞∑
t=1
t
(
[(1− λ) ρ+ λβ] [(1− λ) (1− ρ)]t−1
(1−λ)ρ+λβ
1−(1−λ)(1−ρ)
)
=
∞∑
t=1
t
(
[(1− λ) (1− ρ)]t−1
1
1−(1−λ)(1−ρ)
)
=
∞∑
t=1
t [(1− λ) ρ+ λ] [(1− λ) (1− ρ)]t−1 = 1
1− (1− λ) (1− ρ) =
1
λ+ ρ− λρ.
Average discovery time then equals average cartel duration.
Property 1: If all cartels have the same probabilities of collapse and discovery then
average duration for discovered cartels (average discovery time) equals average
duration for all cartels.
This property may seem counter-intuitive because those cartels that are discovered
would have continued to survive if they had not been discovered in which case one
10This calculation does presume ρ > 0 and/or β > 0 so that there is a positive mass of cartels
that are discovered.
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might think that the average time until death would necessarily exceed the average
time until discovery. But the issue is not whether discovery shortens cartel life - it
does - but rather whether discovery delivers a representative sample of the population
of cartels. Inspecting Table 1, note that the discovery process samples a fraction
(1− λ) ρ + λβ of all surviving cartels and, therefore, the population of discovered
cartels is, indeed, a representative sample of the population of all cartels. Hence,
the average age of cartels in the discovered population is the same as the average
age of cartels in the entire population. Given that much of the paper will involve
loosening the restrictive assumptions that underlie that result, the takeaway should
not be that average duration for discovered cartels is a good proxy for average cartel
duration. Rather the takeaway is that the common perception that average duration
for discovered cartels is necessarily a biased estimate of average cartel duration is
incorrect.
Though, under the assumption of a common birth-death-discovery process, we
can derive an unbiased measure of cartel duration, it is not possible to measure the
likelihood that a cartel is discovered. What we can measure is the cartel survival
rate (1− λ) (1− ρ); that is, the probability that an active cartel neither collapses nor
is discovered. Inspecting Table 1, the survival rate equals the ratio of the mass of
discovered cartels in period t+1 to the mass of discovered cartels in period t. Though
the survival rate can be derived, the probability of collapse λ and the probability of
discovery (conditional on being active) ρ cannot be separately identified, and nothing
can be said about β (which is the probability of discovery conditional on having just
collapsed).
The inability to disentangle λ and ρ is a point not well-appreciated. Assuming
that the empirical model is correctly specified, the estimate of around .15 from studies
such as Bryant and Eckard (1991) is an estimate of the probability of death, 1 −
(1− λ) (1− ρ), not the probability of discovery and conviction, ρ. If there is no
model misspecification, it is then an upper bound on ρ (which is only achieved when
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λ = 0 so cartels are perfectly stable). Yet, many studies appeal to this empirical
work to justify assuming there is a 15% chance each year that a cartel is caught and
convicted. For example, in showing that the socially optimal penalty is approximately
75% of the current formula used by the European Commission, Katsoulacos and Ulph
(2013) assumes the annual probability a cartel pays penalties is .15. Hinloopen and
Soetevent (2008) engage in experimental work to investigate the impact of leniency
programs and assume that subjects who choose to communicate incur a penalty with
probability .15. In discussing the role of customer damages, Sweeney (2006, p. 843)
appeals to Bryant and Eckard (1991) to note that "only about 13-17 per cent of
cartels in the U.S. are detected." And, until deriving this result, one of the authors
of this paper was equally guilty of this error (Harrington, 2014a).
Another misconception is that these estimates allow one to infer how many cartels
escape discovery. As a recent example, an Amicus Curiae Brief submitted to the U.S.
Seventh Circuit Court refers to "estimates suggesting that more than two-thirds of
conspiratorial activity goes undetected and unpunished."11 If we use the expression
in Table 1 (and, for simplicity, assume β = ρ), the fraction of cartels that are not
discovered equals λ(1−ρ)
λ(1−ρ)+ρ . As already noted, λ and ρ are not separately identified so
it would seem one could not infer how many cartels go undiscovered. If the estimated
survival rate s = (1− λ) (1− ρ) is substituted into this expression, the fraction of
cartels that escape discovery can be expressed as 1− ρ
1−s . Given that ρ ∈ (0, 1− s] ,
the fraction of cartels that escape discovery can range from almost none (when ρ is
close to 1 − s) to almost all (when ρ is close to zero). There is then no basis upon
which to infer how many cartels go undiscovered.
To summarize the results of this section, if all cartels are subject to the same
birth-death-discovery process then the population of discovered cartels is a repre-
11“Amicus Curiae Brief of Economists and Professors in Support of Appellant’s Petititon for
Rehearing En Banc”- Motorola Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics, No. 14-8003, 2014 WL
1243797 (7th Cir. Mar. 27, 2014); p. 4. In making this statement, the Brief references Bryant and
Eckard (1991) and Combe, Monnier, and Legal (2008).
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sentative sample of the population of cartels, which implies: 1) average duration
of discovered cartels is an unbiased measure of average cartel duration; and 2) the
estimated probability of death for discovered cartels is an unbiased measure of the
probability of death for cartels. However, the probability of collapse and the proba-
bility of discovery cannot be separately identified and this has the implication that:
1) assuming there is no model misspecification, the estimated death rate in studies
based on the duration of discovered cartels is an upper bound on the probability a
cartel is caught and convicted; and 2) nothing can be inferred about the fraction of
cartels that escape detection.
4 Cartels are Subject to Different Death and Dis-
covery Processes
4.1 General Properties
Given that it is clearly restrictive to assume that all cartels are subject to the same
stochastic process determining death and detection, let us enrich the environment by
allowing cartels to be generated by different processes. This is modeled by allowing
the values for (λ, ρ, β) to vary across cartels. This heterogeneity could be due, for
example, to industry traits or the characteristics of the cartel. For example, the
probability of cartel collapse, λ, could depend on product substitutability and demand
variability, both of which affect the gains to cheating and the losses from punishment;
or on the ease with which firms can monitor compliance. The discovery parameters ρ
and β could depend on the number of firms involved in the cartel as well as the type
of consumers they face, where industrial customers are more likely to detect collusion
than consumers in a retail market.
In each period, a unit mass of cartels is born and k : [0, 1]3 → R+ is the density
function over cartel traits (λ, ρ, β) for those newly formed cartels. By the analysis
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in the preceding section, the average cartel duration for a type-(λ, ρ, β) cartel is
CD (λ, ρ) ≡ (λ+ ρ− λρ)−1. The average cartel duration across cartels of all types is
simply the weighted average of the average cartel duration for a type-(λ, ρ, β) cartel
where the weight is k (λ, ρ, β) :∫ ∫ ∫
(λ+ ρ− λρ)−1 k (λ, ρ, β) dλdρdβ.
In calculating the average duration of discovered cartels (or average discovery
time), first note that the mass of discovered cartels with duration 1 is∫ ∫ ∫
[(1− λ) ρ+ λβ] k (λ, ρ, β) dλdρdβ,
with duration 2 is∫ ∫ ∫
(1− λ) (1− ρ) [(1− λ) ρ+ λβ] k (λ, ρ, β) dλdρdβ,
and with duration T is∫ ∫ ∫
[(1− λ) (1− ρ)]T−1 [(1− λ) ρ+ λβ] k (λ, ρ, β) dλdρdβ.
The total mass of discovered cartels is then
Γ ≡
∞∑
t=1
∫ ∫ ∫
[(1− λ) (1− ρ)]t−1 [(1− λ) ρ+ λβ] k (λ, ρ, β) dλdρdβ
=
∫ ∫ ∫ (
(1− λ) ρ+ λβ
λ+ ρ− λρ
)
k (λ, ρ, β) dλdρdβ.
Hence, average discovery time is(
1
Γ
) ∞∑
t=1
∫ ∫ ∫
t [(1− λ) (1− ρ)]t−1 [(1− λ) ρ+ λβ] k (λ, ρ, β) dλdρdβ
=
(
1
Γ
)∫ ∫ ∫ (
1
[1− (1− λ) (1− ρ)]2
)
[(1− λ) ρ+ λβ] k (λ, ρ, β) dλdρdβ
=
(
1
Γ
)∫ ∫ ∫ (
1
λ+ ρ− λρ
)(
(1− λ) ρ+ λβ
λ+ ρ− λρ
)
k (λ, ρ, β) dλdρdβ
=
(
1
Γ
)∫ ∫ ∫
CD (λ, ρ)P (λ, ρ, β)CD (λ, ρ) k (λ, ρ, β) dλdρdβ
13
where P (λ, ρ, β) ≡ (1− λ) ρ + λβ is the per period probability that a cartel is de-
tected.
The task before us is to compare average duration for all cartels (denoted ACD
for average cartel duration)
ACD ≡
∫ ∫ ∫
CD (λ, ρ) k (λ, ρ, β) dλdρdβ (1)
and average duration for discovered cartels (denoted ADT for average discovery time)
ADT ≡
∫ ∫ ∫
θ (λ, ρ, β)CD (λ, ρ) k (λ, ρ, β) dλdρdβ (2)
where
θ (λ, ρ, β) (3)
≡
(∫ ∫ ∫ (
(1− λ) ρ+ λβ
λ+ ρ− λρ
)
k (λ, ρ, β) dλdρdβ
)−1(
(1− λ) ρ+ λβ
λ+ ρ− λρ
)
=
(
1
Γ
)
P (λ, ρ, β)CD (λ, ρ)
In calculating average cartel duration, the average duration of a type-(λ, ρ, β) cartel
is weighted by how many of them are in the population which is k (λ, ρ, β) . How-
ever, average discovery time weights the average duration of a type-(λ, ρ, β) cartel
by θ (λ, ρ, β) k (λ, ρ, β). If θ (λ, ρ, β) is correlated with average duration then average
discovery time is a biased measure of average duration.
In examining θ (λ, ρ, β) , note that it is proportional to the probability that a
type-(λ, ρ, β) cartel is discovered in a given period, P (λ, ρ, β) , multiplied by average
cartel duration for a cartel of type-(λ, ρ, β), CD (λ, ρ) . If one thinks of discovery as
a sampling process, θ (λ, ρ, β) has a natural interpretation. A cartel with a higher
probability of discovery is more likely to be sampled and thus will be more heavily
weighted in the calculation of average discovery time. A cartel with longer duration
has more opportunities to be sampled because there are more periods for which it
can be discovered; a cartel that is not discovered in the year of its death avoids being
sampled. Thus, higher duration results in a higher value for θ (λ, ρ, β) and those
cartels are more heavily weighted in the calculation of average discovery time.
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Generally, we expect average discovery time to differ from average cartel duration
and, in the ensuing analysis, we will seek to characterize how they differ. But before
doing so, it is worth noting that the two measures are identical when β = 1.12
Examining (3), β = 1 implies θ (λ, ρ, 1) = 1 for all (λ, ρ) and, therefore, ADT = ACD.
The intuition is immediate. If an active cartel is discovered then the act of discovery
causes its death so its discovery time equals its duration. If a cartel that collapses
is then discovered (as is the case when β = 1) then again its discovery time equals
its duration. In other words, the population of discovered cartels is the same as the
population of cartels in which case the "sample" of cartels derived from discovery is
actually the universe of cartels. Clearly, there is no bias in that situation.
When instead β < 1, average discovery time is generally a biased measure of aver-
age cartel duration. The issue is what we can say about the direction and magnitude
of that bias: Does average discovery time tend to over- or under-estimate average
cartel duration? Given that ρ and β are apt to be positively related, let us suppose
for the moment that β = ϕ (ρ) where ϕ′ (ρ) ≥ 0. The weighting factor in ADT is
then
θ (λ, ρ, ϕ (ρ)) =
(
1
Γ
)(
(1− λ) ρ+ λϕ (ρ)
λ+ ρ− λρ
)
,
and is increasing in the probability of discovery:
∂θ (λ, ρ, ϕ (ρ))
∂ρ
=
(
1
Γ
)(
(1− λ)λ (1− ϕ (ρ)) + λϕ′ (ρ) [(1− λ) ρ+ λ]
(λ+ ρ− λρ)2
)
> 0.
Unsurprisingly, cartels endowed with a higher discovery probability are more likely to
be sampled (through discovery) and thus are given more weight in the calculation of
ADT . Furthermore, holding λ fixed, a higher discovery probability results in shorter
cartel duration: (λ+ ρ− λρ)−1 is decreasing in ρ. Thus, variation in ρ causes cartels
12A leniency program could possibly result in β being close to one. As shown in Harrington and
Chang (2013), if leniency is full and firms do not anticipate colluding again then, upon collapse,
firms will act to minimize expected penalties which implies it is a dominant strategy to apply for
leniency. Hence, all dying cartels are discovered.
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with shorter duration to be weighted more, holding λ fixed. Cartels that are more
likely to be discovered are more heavily represented in the population of discovered
cartels and cartels that are more likely to be discovered have shorter duration. This
effect causes average discovery time to under-estimate average cartel duration.
Next consider the effect of changing the probability of collapse:
∂θ (λ, ρ, ϕ (ρ))
∂λ
= −
(
1
Γ
)(
ρ (1− ϕ (ρ))
(λ+ ρ− λρ)2
)
< 0.
Cartels that are more likely to collapse are then under-represented in the population
of discovered cartels because they are more likely to die and disappear before being
detected. Thus, variation in λ causes cartels with shorter duration to be weighted less,
holding ρ fixed. Cartels that are less likely to collapse are more heavily represented
in the population of discovered cartels and cartels that are less likely to collapse have
longer duration. This effect causes average discovery time to over-estimate average
cartel duration.
Summing up to this point, average duration of discovered cartels could either be
an over-estimate or an under-estimate of average duration of all cartels. Relatively
unstable cartels (that is, those with a high value for λ) tend to be under-represented
in the pool of discovered cartels because they are more likely to die before being
discovered. Given that unstable cartels have shorter duration, this effect will cause
average discovery time to over-estimate average cartel duration. Cartels that are
relatively likely to be discovered (that is, those with a high value for ρ) tend to be
over-represented in the pool of discovered cartels. Given that cartels more likely to
be discovered have shorter duration then this effect will cause average discovery time
to under-estimate average cartel duration. The following result is immediate.
Property 2: If there is variation in the discovery probability ρ but not in the collapse
probability λ then average duration of discovered cartels is an under-estimate
of average cartel duration: ADT < ACD. If there is variation in the collapse
probability λ but not in the discovery probability ρ then average duration of
discovered cartels is an over-estimate of average cartel duration: ADT > ACD.
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The bias in using duration on discovered cartels to estimate average cartel dura-
tion (or the probability of cartel death) comes from inter-industry variation in the
stochastic processes determining death and detection. If there is no variation - all
cartels are subject to the same stochastic process - then there is no bias.
4.2 Numerical Analysis
The preceding section showed: 1) when there is variation across cartels in the probabil-
ity of collapse and/or the probability of discovery then, generically, average discovery
time is a biased measure of average cartel duration; 2) when there is only variation in
the probability of collapse then average discovery time is an over-estimate of average
cartel duration; and 3) when there is only variation in the probability of discovery
then average discovery time is an under-estimate of average cartel duration. It is then
variation in cartel collapse and discovery rates that creates bias. A reasonable conjec-
ture is that more variation in collapse (discovery) probabilities ought to make average
discovery more of an over-estimate (under-estimate) of average cartel duration. To
assess the validity of that conjecture, we turn to numerical analysis.
To reduce the number of parameters, set β = ρ so that the probability of discovery
is the same whether the cartel is active or has just collapsed. The task is to specify
distributions on the parameters, calculate average cartel duration and average dis-
covery time, and measure bias which we’ll define as the percentage difference between
ADT and ACD:
Bias = 100
(
ADT − ACD
ACD
)
.
Note that positive (negative) bias means that average discovery time over-estimates
(under-estimates) average cartel duration.
Both λ and ρ are assumed to follow beta distributions.13 A beta distribution is
defined by two shape parameters and can be uniquely characterized by the mean µ
13Numerical analysis was also conducted using uniform and triangular density functions and the
results are qualitatively similar.
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and coeffi cient of variation c (which is the standard deviation divided by the mean).
We first consider the case where λ and ρ are independently distributed with the
following parameters:(
µλ, µρ
)
∈ {0.05, 0.10, 0.15}2 , (cλ, cρ) ∈ {0.1, 0.4, 0.8}2 .
Thus, the average probability of collapse or of discovery ranges from .05 to .15 per
period, which correspond to a per period death rate ranging from .10 to .28. The
standard deviation can be small - only 10% of the mean - or large - 80% of the mean.
In total, there are 81 parameterizations.
The results are displayed in Table 2. In reading the tables, consider Table 2a
which reports average cartel duration for each parameterization. There are 9 rows
and 9 columns. The top three rows correspond to µλ = .05, the middle three rows to
µλ = .1, and the bottom three rows to µλ = .15. Analogously, the three columns on
the left correspond to µρ = .05, the middle three columns to µρ = .1, and the three
columns on the right to µρ = .15. Within each block of three rows and three columns
(corresponding to particular means for λ and ρ), there are three rows and columns
associated with different values for (cλ, cρ). For example, if
(
µλ, µρ
)
= (.1, .1) and
(cλ, cρ) = (.4, .8) then the cartel duration is 6.35 which means on average a cartel
survives for 6.35 periods.
As conjectured, more variation in λ results in a larger over-estimate, while more
variation in ρ results in a larger under-estimate. To show the former result, hold
fixed the distribution on ρ and the mean of λ. As the inter-industry variation in λ is
increased (which occurs when the coeffi cient of variation increases holding the mean
fixed), the bias increases. For example, if
(
µλ, µρ
)
= (.1, .1) and cρ = .1 (so there
is little variation in ρ) then increasing variation in λ by raising cλ from .1 to .4 to
.8 causes the bias to go from 0.0% (bias is almost zero) to 3.1% (average discovery
time slightly over-estimates average cartel duration) to 10.2% (average discovery time
more significantly over-estimates average cartel duration). In all cases, as cλ increases
- holding µλ, µρ, and cρ fixed - average discovery time increases relative to average
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cartel duration so the former is more of an over-estimate. Analogously, as cρ increases
- holding µλ, µρ, and cλ fixed - average discovery time declines relative to average
cartel duration so the former is more of an under-estimate.
Property 3: As the variation across cartels in the probability of collapse increases,
the difference between average discovery time and average cartel duration in-
creases so average discovery time is more of an over-estimate. As the variation
across cartels in the probability of discovery increases, the difference between
average discovery time and average cartel duration decreases so average discov-
ery time is more of an under-estimate.
A second takeaway is that the extent of over- or under-estimation is not very
large in magnitude. For most parameterizations, it is less than 20%. It is possible,
however, for the absolute size of bias to be significant. This occurs when the mean
and variance of the collapse rate is large and the mean and variance of the discovery
rate is small. For example, if
(
µλ, µρ
)
= (.15, .05) and (cλ, cρ) = (.8, .1) then average
discovery time over-estimates average cartel duration by about 34%.
Although the case when λ and ρ are independent is a useful benchmark, it could be
more natural for λ and ρ to be positively correlated. For example, in an industry with
more firms, the probability of collapse may tend to be higher because there is a larger
incremental gain to cheating which makes the cartel less stable. In addition, more
firms may raise the probability of discovery because there are more people involved
so there is a greater chance that someone, either intentionally or inadvertently, would
reveal information about the cartel to a customer or the authorities. Furthermore, a
higher discovery probability will reduce the expected payoff from collusion and that
could lead to a higher probability of collapse.
To assess the robustness of our results, let us then allow λ and ρ to be positively
correlated. Using a system of bivariate distributions introduced by Plackett (1965),
joint distributions between λ and ρ are constructed that have the same marginal
distributions assumed for the independent case. Plackett’s system is a general method
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to generate bivariate distribution given any pair of marginal distributions. The joint
distribution is characterized by one parameter ψ ≥ 0. As ψ goes from 0 to 1, the two
random variables go from being highly negatively correlated to independent. As ψ
goes from 1 to +∞, the two random variables are increasingly positively correlated.
Hence, one can numerically search over ψ for desired correlation. For illustration,
Figure 1 plots the marginal densities when
(
µλ, µρ
)
= (.1, .1) and (cλ, cρ) = (.4, .8),
and Figure 2 plots the corresponding joint densities for correlation being 0, .3 and .7,
respectively.
Results are in Tables 3 and 4 and they are presented in the same manner as Table
2. Table 3 assumes λ and ρ have a moderate positive correlation of 0.30 (ψ ' 2.8),
and Table 4 assumes λ and ρ have a more significant correlation of 0.70 (ψ ' 16).
We find the relationship between the inter-industry variation of λ and ρ and bias is
quantitatively similar to that in the independent case. However, when either λ or
ρ have a large degree of variation, there can be violation to the pattern described
in Property 3. For example, when
(
µλ, µρ
)
= (.1, .1) and cρ = .8 in Table 4, the
bias decreases as the variation in λ is increased by raising cλ from .1 to .4. However,
these violations are all small in magnitude, and we believe that the main message of
Property 3 is broadly relevant even when λ and ρ are positively correlated.
5 Estimating Cartel Duration and the Probability
of Death
Thus far, we have provided a framework within which to think about bias in estimates
of cartel duration due to a potentially biased sample in the form of discovered cartels.
It was shown that variation in the probability of collapse across cartels results in
average duration of discovered cartels being an over-estimate, while variation in the
probability of discovery across cartels results in average duration of discovered cartels
being an over-estimate. We now turn to estimating the theoretical model and do so
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with two objectives. First, it is to determine whether the data is consistent with
the presence of bias. We find that there is bias and, though the estimates prove not
to shed light on its direction, it does offer bounds on the extent of bias. Second,
it is to provide an estimate of the probability of cartel death that takes account
of that bias. Previous approaches deliver an estimate of the probability of cartel
death conditional on the cartel being discovered. The theoretical framework of this
paper is used to estimate the unconditional probability of death, which is the object
of interest. However, there are some qualifications to be made with this approach,
which we discuss below.
To make the empirical analysis more manageable, it is assumed β = ρ.14 Given a
density function k (·) for (λ, ρ), the theoretical framework provides a density function
on the duration of discovered cartels and on the duration of all cartels. The probability
density on duration τ conditional on the cartel being discovered is
∫ ∫  ρ [(1− λ) (1− ρ)]τ−1∫ ∫ (
ρ
λ+ρ−λρ
)
k (λ, ρ) dλdρ
 k (λ, ρ) dλdρ, (4)
and the probability density on duration τ for all cartels is∫ ∫
(λ+ ρ− λρ) [(1− λ) (1− ρ)]τ−1 k (λ, ρ) dλdρ. (5)
The empirical strategy is to specify a functional form on k (·), fit (4) to the data on
discovered cartels to recover information on the parameters of k (·), and to use those
estimated parameters to simulate the density function on duration for all cartels in
(5).
One weakness of this approach is that it is reliant on the functional form specified
for k (·). A second weakness is that it is not clear the parameters to k (·) are identified.
Because of these concerns, we have chosen to take a Bayesian approach which avoids
focusing on any particular set of estimates and instead has the more modest goal of
14As stated in Section 2, leniency programs could cause β > ρ. Our empirical analysis will focus
on the pre-leniency program era in the U.S. in which case β = ρ is a plausible assumption.
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providing a more informed set of beliefs on the variables of interest. In light of these
qualifications, the ensuing estimates should be taken as an improvement over previous
estimates rather than definitive estimates of cartel duration and the probability of
cartel death.
In specifying a functional form for k (·), we use the specification in Section 4; hence,
a maintained hypothesis is that a cartel draws (λ, ρ) from a joint beta distribution
defined by the five parameters θ ≡
(
µλ, µρ, cλ, cρ, ψ
)
. A Bayesian approach requires
specifying a prior set of beliefs on θ which, reflecting our limited prior information,
is assumed to be a uniform distribution with a fairly wide support. The next step is
to use the data on discovered cartels to inform us about θ. More specifically, given
a particular value for θ, we calculate the likelihood of observing the duration data
on discovered cartels for when the density function takes the form in (4). Using this
likelihood, the prior distribution on θ is updated to derive a posterior distribution on
θ. Based on these posterior beliefs on θ, a distribution can be derived on the cartel
death rate and on the bias associated with using average discovered cartel duration
as a proxy for average cartel duration.
5.1 Data
Before turning to a more detailed description of the empirical method, it is useful
to describe the data. Coming from the Commerce Clearing House Trade Regulation
Reports, our sample consists of price-fixing cases pursued by the Antitrust Division
of the U.S. Department of Justice which resulted in a conviction, guilty plea, or
nolo contendere. This data source is the same as that used in Bryant and Eckard
(1991) whose data set encompassed 184 indicted cartels that were discovered over the
period of 1961 to 1988.15 Their data set has been extended so that it now runs from
15We use DUR2 from Bryant and Eckard (1991) which defines cartel duration from the cartel’s
latest start date to its earliest discovery date where we round duration to the nearest greatest number
of years. The indictment date is used if the discovery date is not available. We chose to use DUR2
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1961 to 2004 and includes 429 discovered cartels.16 As explained below, a proper
implementation of our empirical strategy will require using only a subset of the data.
5.2 Empirical Method
In each year, a collection of cartels are born and each member of that cohort of cartels
will eventually have a realized duration. In the subsequent discussion, τ refers to a car-
tel’s duration and T to a particular year. Suppose that we observe cartels which were
discovered (and, therefore, died) between years T1 and T2. For each of those cartels,
there is a birth year and a duration. Organize the data by birth cohort and let Nτ ,T
denote the number of cartels born in year T that had duration τ in the data. While
there is no bound on the earliest cohort one could have represented in the data, the
latest possible cohort is T2 which is associated with discovering a cartel with duration
1 in year T2. For a cohort T < T1, only cartels of duration T1−T+1 to T2−T+1 can be
observed; cartels of duration less than T1−T + 1 would have been discovered prior to
the initial year in which discoveries were recorded. For cohort T ∈ {T1, T1 + 1, ..., T2} ,
only cartels of duration 1 to T2−T +1 can be observed. The data for cohort T is then
represented by the vector N∗,T ≡
(
Nmax{1,T1−T+1},T , ..., NT2−T+1,T
)
, and we will have
NT ≡
∑T2−T+1
τ=max{1,T1−T+1}Nτ ,T denote the number of discovered cartels from cohort T .
The data set is then the collection of vectors N∗,T for all cohorts with at least one
observation. In the ensuing description, we will let Ω denote the data set and Λ
denote the set of cohorts.
We want to compute the likelihood of observing Ω if each cartel’s value for (λ, ρ)
is drawn from a joint beta distribution given θ. To compute the likelihood, consider
rather than their alternative measure DUR1 because the latter has a mode of cartel duration well
above one year which is less consistent with our model.
16The data is collected only up to 2004 because, after that year, the antitrust cases upon which
the data is based are provided by Wolters Kluwer Law & Business through its online resource. With
that change, the Topical Index for the antitrust cases is obsolete and no longer indicates which cases
pertain to a particular cartel.
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cohort T (that is, discovered cartels that were born in year T ). The probability
of observing the cohort T vector of durations N∗,T conditional on there being NT
discovered cartels is, from the theoretical model,
Pr(N∗,T |NT , θ) =
 NT
Nmax{1,T1−T+1},T , ..., NT2−T+1,T
∏T2−T+1
τ=max{1,T1−T+1}
(
p(τ , θ)
QT (θ)
)Nτ,T
(6)
where
 NT
Nmax{1,T1−T+1},T , ..., NT2−T+1,T
 is the multinomial coeffi cient,
QT (θ) =
∑T2−T+1
τ=max{1,T1−T+1}
∫ ∫
ρ[(1− λ)(1− ρ)]τ−1k(λ, ρ)dλdρ (7)
is the probability of being discovered with duration between max{1, T1− T + 1} and
T2 − T + 1, and
p(τ , θ) =
∫ ∫
ρ[(1− λ)(1− ρ)]τ−1k(λ, ρ)dλdρ (8)
is the probability of being discovered with duration τ . In other words, if there are NT
independent draws for which the likelihood of a draw taking value τ is p(τ , θ)/QT (θ)
for τ ∈ {max{1, T1 − T + 1}, ..., T2 − T + 1} (and 0 otherwise) then the probability of
observing N∗,T is (6). Given (6) is the likelihood of observing the vector of durations
for cohort T, conditional on their being NT discovered cartels, the probability of
observing data from cohorts in Λ, conditional on the number of discovered cartels in
each year, is
Pr(Ω|θ, {NT}T∈Λ) =
∏
T∈Λ
Pr(N∗,T |NT , θ). (9)
To use these calculated likelihoods in a Bayesian framework, a prior distribution
on the population distribution parameters θ is specified which is assumed to be the
uniform conditional on the number of discoveries:
Pr(θ| {NT}T∈Λ) ∼ U(Θ). (10)
Our estimation does not then use any information from the number of discovered
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cartels and is based solely on the duration of those discovered cartels.17 The diffi -
culty in deriving any information from the number of discovered cartels is that it
requires some understanding about how many cartels there are which means speci-
fying a cartel birth process. At this stage, we have little insight into the cartel birth
process. Furthermore, if the number of discovered cartels were to be used then a
prior distribution on the number of cartels would have to be specified and, even if a
uniform prior is used, results would be highly sensitive to the specified support. For
these reasons, the number of discovered cartels was not used in our estimation.
We next specify the support of the uniform prior distribution on θ ≡
(
µλ, µρ, cλ, cρ, ψ
)
.
The means of the distributions have support:
(
µλ, µρ
)
∈ [0.025, 0.20]2, which implies
the annual probability of death can range from 0.049 to 0.36. The coeffi cients of
variation are assumed to have supports: cλ ∈
[
0,
√
1−µλ
1+µλ
]
and cρ ∈
[
0,
√
1−µρ
1+µρ
]
. The
lower bound of zero allows for the homogeneous case (so all cartels have the same λ
and ρ), while the upper bound is chosen to preclude the case when the density k(λ, ρ)
is positive at (λ, ρ) = (0, 0) which would mean average cartel duration is infinity.18
Finally, ψ ∈ [1, 10], which allows the correlation to range from 0 to approximately
0.6. We also experimented with other reasonable parameter space specifications and
did not find any significant change in the results.19 Table 5 reports the first two mo-
ments of the prior distribution. Based on this distribution, the mean annual cartel
death rate of 0.21 and the range based on two standard deviations is [0.084, 0.336] . In
specifying the prior distribution, we want to have highly dispersed beliefs so that the
17Similarly, Bryant and Eckard (1991) used only duration data to estimate the death rate. Though
they did use the number of discoveries to estimate the birth rate, that estimation required making
the assumption that all cartels are discovered and it is the problematic nature of such an assumption
that is the starting point to this paper.
18When cλ >
√
(1− µλ)/(1 + µλ), the alpha of the marginal for the beta distribution on λ is
larger than 1, which implies that the density is positive at 0. The same applies to cρ.
19We considered
(
µλ, µρ
)
∈ [0.05, 0.175]2 and
(
µλ, µρ
)
∈ [0.05, 0.15]2, (cλ, cρ) ∈
[
0, 0.75
√
1−µλ
1+µλ
]
×[
0, 0.75
√
1−µρ
1+µρ
]
, and ψ = 1.
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data on discovered cartel duration - not the prior on θ - largely drives the posterior
beliefs on θ.
Given (9) and (10), the posterior distribution on the population parameter vector
θ is
Pr(θ|Ω) ∝ Pr(Ω|θ, {NT}T∈Λ) Pr(θ| {NT}T∈Λ) (11)
∝
∏
T∈Λ
∏T2−T+1
τ=max{1,T1−T+1}
(
p(τ , θ)
QT (θ)
)Nτ,T
=
∏T2−T+1
τ=max{1,T1−T+1}
p(τ , θ)Nτ,T
/∏
T∈Λ
QT (t, θ)
NT .
It is with this posterior distribution that we can provide measures of the cartel death
rate and the possible extent of bias from using discovered cartel duration as a proxy
for cartel duration. For each value of θ ∈ Θ, the mean cartel death rate can be
calculated in a straightforward manner. The posterior beliefs on θ in (11) will then
give us posterior beliefs on the mean cartel death rate. Analogously, for each value of
θ ∈ Θ, bias can be calculated using the method in Section 4 and the posterior beliefs
on θ are then used to generate posterior beliefs on bias.
This empirical strategy requires that the distribution on (λ, ρ) is fairly stable over
time.20 However, there was a potentially radical change in θ with the revision of
the Leniency Program in 1993.21 For this reason, we have restricted our analysis to
cartels that are largely from the pre-Leniency Program era.22 The ensuing analysis is
based on cartel cohorts starting in 1960 on through 1985, so we only use the subset
{1960, ..., 1985} of Λ. 1960 is a natural starting date as it is the year the electrical
20The analogous maintained assumption in previous empirical analyses is that (λ, ρ) is stable over
time.
21For information on leniency programs, see Spagnolo (2008); and for details on the program
operated by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, see Hammond (2005).
22A change in enforcement policy will result in a change in the stochastic process on birth, death,
and discovery which results in a transition to a new stationary distribution on cartels. These
dynamics are explored in Harrington and Chang (2009) and some results are offered for drawing
inferences about the impact of a change in policy. Miller (2009) pursues this type of approach to
assess empirically the impact of the 1993 revision.
26
equipment conspiracy was indicted which could have signalled a new regime in terms
of enforcement. Given we have data on cartels discovered during 1961-2004, durations
in {1, ..., 2005− T} are observed for cohort T with the exception of T = 1960 for which
we observe durations in {2, ..., 45} . The 26 cohort years covered by 1960-85 encompass
224 cartels. While six of those cartels were discovered after 1993, this means less than
3% of the observations are from the Leniency Program era. Figure 3 provides the
histogram on duration for the discovered cartels used in the empirical analysis. The
mean duration for discovered cartels is 5.8 years with a fairly substantial standard
deviation of 4.7 years.23
While a separate analysis could be done using cartel cohorts during (and just
before) the Leniency Program era, many of the cohorts will be censored because data
is available only for cartels discovered through 2004. For example, we only observe
durations of 1, 2, and 3 years for the cohort of cartels born in 2002. Though the
empirical model takes such censoring into account when it calculates the likelihood,
the problem is one of identification. We conducted the analysis for cohorts running
from 1985 to 2004, of which 64% of the cartels were discovered post-1993. The
likelihood function based on (4) is essentially flat; that is, the likelihood of observing
the durations for these cohorts of discovered cartels is very similar for almost all values
of θ in the support. Given there is very little information in the data to discriminate
among values of θ, the posterior beliefs on θ are basically the same as the prior beliefs.
Further analysis was able to attribute this finding to the censoring of cartels with long
duration. Estimating the model for cohorts 1960-85 after excluding cartels with more
than 10 years of duration, the posterior beliefs were quite close to the prior beliefs.
Furthermore, this property is not due to a reduction in the number of observations. If
we instead estimated the model using only data from even-year cohorts over 1960-85
- thereby reducing the number of observations from 224 to 121 (which is a far larger
23These moments are very close to those for the entire data set of 429 cartels discovered over
1961-2004, which has a mean of 5.4 years and a standard deviation of 4.7 years.
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reduction than the 43 observations lost by excluding cartels whose duration exceeds
10 years) - the estimates are very similar to when we use all cohorts over 1960-85.
5.3 Estimation of Posterior Beliefs
The moments for the posterior distribution on θ ≡
(
µλ, µρ, cλ, cρ, ψ
)
are reported in
Table 5. The first point to note is that the posterior beliefs are clearly differ from the
prior beliefs. The prior mean of λ and ρ are 0.110, while the posterior means are 0.088
and 0.092, respectively. The means of the coeffi cient of variations are significantly
reduced from 0.450 to 0.299 for λ and to 0.253 for ρ. However, there is effectively no
change in beliefs on ψ. What all this means is that, within the specified support on
θ, the data on discovered cartel duration is more consistent with joint distributions
on (λ, ρ) which give more mass to low values of (λ, ρ) and to less variation in (λ, ρ)
across cartels. The data sheds no light on the correlation between λ and ρ (which,
recall, is determined by ψ).
To provide more information on the posterior beliefs, Figure 3 plots the joint
density functions for a pair of parameters from
(
µλ, µρ, cλ, cρ, ψ
)
while setting the
other three parameter values equal to their posterior means. Figure 3a reports the
joint density function on the mean of the probability of discovery and the mean of the
probability of collapse, (µρ, µλ), when (cλ, cρ, ψ) = (0.299, 0.253, 5.3). The "mountain
range" encompasses pairs (µρ, µλ) for which the mean death rate is around 0.17
and reflects the limited extent to which the data and model are able to distinguish
between the average probability of collapse and the average probability of discovery.
Figure 3b reports the joint density function on the coeffi cients of variation of the
probability of collapse and the probability of discovery, (cλ, cρ), when
(
µλ, µρ, ψ
)
=
(0.088, 0.092, 5.3). The density peaks at (cλ, cρ) = (0, 0) which is when there is no
variation in (λ, ρ). While there is no bias in that case, note that posterior beliefs
assign significant probability to (cλ, cρ) > (0, 0) in which case there is bias. Results
on bias are provided below. We also find that there is more variation across cartels in
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the probability of collapse than in the probability of discovery: the mean of cλ exceeds
the mean of cρ. Furthermore, this ordering is robust to the different assumptions on
the support of θ mentioned earlier. Finally, Figure 3c sets
(
µλ, µρ
)
= (0.088, 0.092)
and reports the density function on (c, ψ) where c (= cλ = cρ) is a common coeffi cient
of variation. There is not much to report here other than that beliefs on ψ are fairly
uniform.
Given this posterior distribution on λ and ρ, we can use it to measure the amount
of bias associated with measuring cartel duration with data on discovered cartels.
For a given distribution on (λ, ρ) - that is, particular values for
(
µλ, µρ, cλ, cρ, ψ
)
-
we showed in Section 4 how one can calculate average duration of discovered cartels,
ADT , and average duration of cartels, ACD. Recall that duration bias is measured
by
Bias = 100
(
ADT − ACD
ACD
)
.
Given posterior beliefs on
(
µλ, µρ, cλ, cρ, ψ
)
, the numerical method for estimating bias
is to repeatedly draw values for
(
µλ, µρ, cλ, cρ, ψ
)
according to those posterior beliefs
and, for each draw, calculate Bias. In this manner, a density function on bias is
constructed.
The solid line in Figure 4 is that posterior density function on Bias. The density
function peaks at Bias = 0 because the posterior density on θ is highest at (cλ, cρ) =
(0, 0) which, from the analysis in Section 3, implies no bias. In addition, Bias can
be close to zero even when (cλ, cρ) > (0, 0). Recall from Section 4 that variation
in λ causes positive bias and variation in ρ causes negative bias. Thus, if there are
comparable amounts of variation in both the collapse and discovery probabilities,
they will tend to cancel each other out so that bias is small. It is then not surprising
that the density function on Bias peaks at zero. In examining the bounds on bias,
posterior beliefs assign positive density ranging from around -15% to +10%. That is,
average duration of discovered cartels could overestimate average cartel duration by
as much as 10% or underestimate it by as much as 15%. Given average discovered
29
cartel duration in the data set of 5.8 years, this implies a range from 5.27 to 6.82
years.24
Note that this posterior density function on Bias is being significantly influenced
by the data for it is quite distinct from the prior density function on Bias which
is the dashed line. In particular, the posterior distribution is much less dispersed
than the prior distribution. The standard deviation on the prior density function is
10.9%, while it is only 4.7% on the posterior density function. Thus, if we consider
two standard deviations from the mean Bias of −0.3%, the range of Bias for the
prior density function is −22.1% to +21.5% and for the posterior density function
is −9.7% to +9.1%. That the posterior distribution is much tighter than the prior
distribution is robust to changing the support on the prior distribution. In sum, we
find there to be a modest amount of bias associated with using the average duration
of discovered cartels as a proxy for the average duration of all cartels.
Finally, and perhaps of primary interest, the posterior distribution on λ and ρ
can be used to yield an estimate of the cartel death rate. We construct the average
annual probability of death as follows. Given particular values for λ and ρ, a cartel
dies with probability [1− (1− λ) (1− ρ)] in any period. For a given value for θ, the
population average probability of death is then∫ ∫
[1− (1− λ) (1− ρ)] k (λ, ρ; θ) dλdρ. (12)
We then use the posterior beliefs on θ to derive an expectation of the population
average probability of death by integrating (12) with respect to those posterior be-
liefs.25 This method is designed to take account of the bias associated with using
data on discovered cartels. As reported in Table 5, the average annual probability
that a cartels dies is 0.174. With a standard deviation of 0.015, a two standard devi-
ation interval around the mean ranges from 0.144 to 0.204, which contains previous
24It is important to keep in mind that there is also sampling error associated with using discovered
cartels.
25These integrals are approximated by taking 2,500 draws according to the relevant distribution.
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estimates. Given our estimates of bias are modest, such a finding is not surprising.
It would then seem that, in spite of concerns of bias from using the duration of dis-
covered cartels, we do not find evidence that it has produced particularly misleading
estimates.
6 Concluding Remarks
Accurate measures of cartel duration and the probability of cartel death are critical
components in assessing to what extent cartels are stable and in evaluating the effect
of competition policy in terms of destabilizing cartels. At present, there is much
confusion and misinformation about what one can infer about the stability of cartels
using data on discovered cartels. One of the contributions of this paper is constructing
a theoretical framework within which to explore sources of bias associated with using
discovered cartel duration as a proxy for cartel duration and, hopefully, bring clarity
to these issues.
Our theoretical analysis showed that bias is tied to variation in the probabilities
of death and discovery across cartels. If that variation is small then bias is small.
If variation in the probability of collapse across cartels is large relative to variation
in the probability of discovery then average duration of discovered cartels is an over-
estimate of average cartel duration; while if variation in the probability of collapse
across cartels is small relative to variation in the probability of discovery then average
duration of discovered cartels is an under-estimate of average cartel duration. This
theoretical construct is then used to estimate the extent of bias and deliver an estimate
of the probability of death that takes account of that bias. Data on discovered cartel
duration is used to recover information on the parameters defining the distribution
on the probabilities of collapse and discovery across cartels. With a posterior set
of beliefs on those parameters, the distribution on duration for all cartels can be
simulated. There is evidence of modest bias associated with using average discovered
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cartel duration as a proxy for average cartel duration; on the order of 10-15%. Finally,
we find that a cartel born between 1960 and 1985 had a 17% chance of dying in a
year, either through internal collapse or discovery by the authorities.
This paper has shown that progress can be made in learning about the latent
universe of cartels using data on the observed sample of discovered cartels. The ap-
proach is rooted in specifying a class of stochastic processes describing cartel birth,
death, and discovery. An important future direction is to construct such a stochastic
process by building an economic model that endogenizes the decision of firms to form
a cartel, the instability of collusion that would result in collapse, and the discovery of
a cartel by customers or a competition authority. Of particular value is learning how
market conditions - such as the number firms, cost and demand variability, whether
the product is an intermediate good or is sold in a retail market (so customers are
either firms or consumers) - determine cartel birth, death, and discovery. Such a
model would provide the additional structure that could be used to more effectively
extract information on the latent distribution on cartels from data on the observed
distribution of discovered cartels. Progress along theses lines will allow us to better
track the population of cartels and eventually assess how the cartel population re-
sponds to policy initiatives and whether we are winning or losing the battle against
cartels.
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Table 1: Population of Cartels in the Current Period
Mass of cartels born  periods ago Mass of cartels of duration  Mass of cartels of duration 
 and are alive in the current period that died in the current period discovered in the current period
1 1 (1− ) +  (1− ) + 
2 (1− ) (1− ) (1− ) (1− ) [(1− ) + ] (1− ) (1− ) [(1− ) + ]
3 [(1− ) (1− )]2 [(1− ) (1− )]2 [(1− ) + ] [(1− ) (1− )]2 [(1− ) + ]
...
 [(1− ) (1− )]−1 [(1− ) (1− )]−1 [(1− ) + ] [(1− ) (1− )]−1 [(1− ) + ]
Sum [(1− ) + ]
P∞
=1 [(1− ) (1− )]
−1 [(1− ) + ]
P∞
=1 [(1− ) (1− )]
−1
= 1 = (1−)+
1−(1−)(1−)
Table 2a: Average Cartel Durations When λ and ρ Are Independent (ψ = 1)
Periods µρ = .05 µρ = .1 µρ = .15
cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8 cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8 cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8
µλ = .05
cλ = .1 10.31 10.66 11.64 6.93 7.39 8.78 5.23 5.68 7.26
cλ = .4 10.66 11.11 12.42 7.03 7.54 9.2 5.26 5.75 7.57
cλ = .8 11.64 12.42 15.21 7.3 7.96 10.69 5.37 5.94 8.65
µλ = .1
cλ = .1 6.93 7.03 7.3 5.29 5.46 5.95 4.28 4.49 5.13
cλ = .4 7.39 7.54 7.96 5.46 5.69 6.35 4.36 4.61 5.42
cλ = .8 8.78 9.2 10.69 5.95 6.35 7.9 4.58 4.95 6.55
µλ = .15
cλ = .1 5.23 5.26 5.37 4.28 4.36 4.58 3.62 3.73 4.06
cλ = .4 5.68 5.75 5.94 4.49 4.61 4.95 3.73 3.88 4.33
cλ = .8 7.26 7.57 8.65 5.13 5.42 6.55 4.06 4.33 5.51
Table 2b: Average Discovery Time When λ and ρ Are Independent (ψ = 1)
Periods µρ = .05 µρ = .1 µρ = .15
cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8 cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8 cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8
µλ = .05
cλ = .1 10.3 10.26 9.98 6.92 7.1 7.28 5.22 5.47 5.88
cλ = .4 11.01 11.09 11.04 7.12 7.38 7.81 5.29 5.6 6.23
cλ = .8 12.85 13.45 15.11 7.6 8.12 9.75 5.49 5.95 7.54
µλ = .1
cλ = .1 6.95 6.83 6.49 5.29 5.26 5.07 4.27 4.31 4.25
cλ = .4 7.88 7.79 7.48 5.63 5.66 5.6 4.43 4.52 4.6
cλ = .8 10.71 11.06 11.99 6.56 6.87 7.79 4.85 5.14 6.05
µλ = .15
cλ = .1 5.25 5.15 4.9 4.28 4.21 4 3.62 3.59 3.44
cλ = .4 6.22 6.12 5.82 4.71 4.68 4.52 3.84 3.86 3.79
cλ = .8 9.71 9.99 10.8 5.97 6.21 6.96 4.46 4.68 5.39
Table 2c: Biases in Percentage When λ and ρ Are Independent (ψ = 1)
% µρ = .05 µρ = .1 µρ = .15
cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8 cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8 cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8
µλ = .05
cλ = .1 0.0 -3.7 -14.3 -0.1 -3.9 -17.1 -0.2 -3.7 -19.1
cλ = .4 3.3 -0.2 -11.1 1.2 -2.2 -15.2 0.6 -2.6 -17.7
cλ = .8 10.4 8.3 -0.6 4.2 2.1 -8.8 2.2 0.1 -12.9
µλ = .1
cλ = .1 0.2 -2.9 -11.1 0.0 -3.8 -14.8 -0.1 -4.1 -17.2
cλ = .4 6.7 3.4 -6.0 3.1 -0.4 -11.8 1.7 -1.9 -15.1
cλ = .8 22.0 20.2 12.2 10.2 8.2 -1.4 5.8 3.7 -7.6
µλ = .15
cλ = .1 0.4 -2.1 -8.8 0.1 -3.3 -12.7 0.0 -3.8 -15.2
cλ = .4 9.4 6.4 -2.1 5.0 1.6 -8.8 3.0 -0.6 -12.6
cλ = .8 33.7 32.1 24.9 16.4 14.7 6.2 9.9 8.0 -2.2
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Table 3a: Average Cartel Durations When Correlation is 0.3 (ψ ' 2.8)
Periods µρ = .05 µρ = .1 µρ = .15
cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8 cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8 cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8
µλ = .05
cλ = .1 10.32 10.73 11.79 6.94 7.43 8.9 5.23 5.71 7.37
cλ = .4 10.73 11.41 13.14 7.07 7.72 9.79 5.29 5.88 8.07
cλ = .8 11.79 13.14 17.64 7.37 8.35 12.43 5.41 6.19 10.1
µλ = .1
cλ = .1 6.94 7.07 7.37 5.29 5.5 6.03 4.28 4.52 5.2
cλ = .4 7.43 7.72 8.35 5.5 5.84 6.73 4.38 4.73 5.77
cλ = .8 8.9 9.79 12.43 6.03 6.73 9.27 4.64 5.23 7.75
µλ = .15
cλ = .1 5.23 5.29 5.41 4.28 4.38 4.64 3.62 3.76 4.11
cλ = .4 5.71 5.88 6.19 4.52 4.73 5.23 3.76 3.99 4.6
cλ = .8 7.37 8.07 10.1 5.2 5.77 7.75 4.11 4.6 6.58
Table 3b: Average Discovery Time When Correlation is 0.3 (ψ ' 2.8)
Periods µρ = .05 µρ = .1 µρ = .15
cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8 cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8 cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8
µλ = .05
cλ = .1 10.32 10.32 10.05 6.94 7.14 7.36 5.23 5.5 5.95
cλ = .4 11.09 11.38 11.45 7.16 7.59 8.22 5.32 5.75 6.59
cλ = .8 13.05 14.38 17.48 7.7 8.61 11.34 5.54 6.26 8.8
µλ = .1
cλ = .1 6.95 6.84 6.49 5.29 5.28 5.1 4.28 4.33 4.29
cλ = .4 7.92 7.91 7.57 5.67 5.81 5.8 4.46 4.65 4.81
cλ = .8 10.9 11.88 13.87 6.66 7.35 9.09 4.92 5.47 7.1
µλ = .15
cλ = .1 5.25 5.15 4.88 4.28 4.23 4.01 3.62 3.61 3.46
cλ = .4 6.23 6.16 5.8 4.74 4.78 4.62 3.87 3.96 3.92
cλ = .8 9.89 10.78 12.63 6.07 6.68 8.18 4.53 5.01 6.37
Table 3c: Biases in Percentage When Correlation is 0.3 (ψ ' 2.8)
% µρ = .05 µρ = .1 µρ = .15
cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8 cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8 cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8
µλ = .05
cλ = .1 0.0 -3.8 -14.8 -0.1 -3.9 -17.4 -0.1 -3.6 -19.3
cλ = .4 3.3 -0.3 -12.8 1.3 -1.8 -16.1 0.7 -2.2 -18.4
cλ = .8 10.7 9.4 -0.9 4.5 3.2 -8.7 2.4 1.1 -12.9
µλ = .1
cλ = .1 0.1 -3.2 -12.0 0.0 -3.9 -15.3 -0.1 -4.1 -17.6
cλ = .4 6.5 2.5 -9.2 3.2 -0.5 -13.8 1.8 -1.7 -16.7
cλ = .8 22.4 21.3 11.6 10.4 9.2 -2.0 6.1 4.7 -8.4
µλ = .15
cλ = .1 0.3 -2.6 -9.9 0.1 -3.5 -13.4 -0.1 -4.0 -15.9
cλ = .4 9.1 4.8 -6.4 4.9 1.0 -11.6 3.0 -0.8 -14.9
cλ = .8 34.1 33.5 25.1 16.7 15.7 5.6 10.2 8.9 -3.1
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Table 4a: Average Cartel Durations When Correlation is 0.7 (ψ ' 16)
Periods µρ = .05 µρ = .1 µρ = .15
cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8 cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8 cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8
µλ = .05
cλ = .1 10.34 10.82 11.99 6.95 7.49 9.08 5.24 5.75 7.53
cλ = .4 10.82 11.84 14.2 7.12 7.99 10.69 5.32 6.05 8.87
cλ = .8 11.99 14.2 22.09 7.47 8.89 15.67 5.47 6.53 12.87
µλ = .1
cλ = .1 6.95 7.12 7.47 5.31 5.54 6.13 4.29 4.56 5.3
cλ = .4 7.49 7.99 8.89 5.54 6.06 7.29 4.42 4.91 6.31
cλ = .8 9.08 10.69 15.67 6.13 7.29 11.92 4.7 5.62 10.12
µλ = .15
cλ = .1 5.24 5.32 5.47 4.29 4.42 4.7 3.63 3.79 4.18
cλ = .4 5.75 6.05 6.53 4.56 4.91 5.62 3.79 4.14 5
cλ = .8 7.53 8.87 12.87 5.3 6.31 10.12 4.18 5 8.76
Table 4b: Average Discovery Time When Correlation is 0.7 (ψ ' 16)
Periods µρ = .05 µρ = .1 µρ = .15
cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8 cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8 cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8
µλ = .05
cλ = .1 10.34 10.39 10.12 6.95 7.21 7.45 5.24 5.55 6.04
cλ = .4 11.19 11.8 11.93 7.23 7.89 8.78 5.36 5.96 7.11
cλ = .8 13.33 15.81 21.8 7.82 9.32 14.36 5.62 6.7 11.26
µλ = .1
cλ = .1 6.96 6.85 6.48 5.3 5.32 5.14 4.29 4.37 4.33
cλ = .4 7.97 8.07 7.58 5.72 6.02 6.02 4.5 4.84 5.07
cλ = .8 11.16 13.22 17.28 6.8 8.1 11.59 5.01 5.98 9.17
µλ = .15
cλ = .1 5.24 5.14 4.84 4.29 4.24 4.02 3.63 3.63 3.48
cλ = .4 6.25 6.19 5.64 4.78 4.91 4.69 3.9 4.1 4.06
cλ = .8 10.15 12.12 16.09 6.21 7.45 10.61 4.62 5.54 8.36
Table 4c: Biases in Percentage When Correlation is 0.7 (ψ ' 16)
% µρ = .05 µρ = .1 µρ = .15
cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8 cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8 cρ = .1 cρ = .4 cρ = .8
µλ = .05
cλ = .1 0.0 -4.0 -15.6 -0.1 -3.8 -17.9 -0.1 -3.5 -19.7
cλ = .4 3.4 -0.3 -16.0 1.5 -1.2 -17.9 0.9 -1.5 -19.8
cλ = .8 11.1 11.4 -1.3 4.8 4.9 -8.4 2.7 2.6 -12.6
µλ = .1
cλ = .1 0.0 -3.7 -13.2 0.0 -4.1 -16.2 -0.1 -4.1 -18.3
cλ = .4 6.4 1.1 -14.7 3.3 -0.7 -17.4 2.0 -1.4 -19.6
cλ = .8 23.0 23.6 10.3 10.9 11.1 -2.8 6.4 6.4 -9.4
µλ = .15
cλ = .1 0.1 -3.4 -11.5 0.0 -3.9 -14.5 -0.1 -4.2 -16.8
cλ = .4 8.7 2.3 -13.5 4.9 0.1 -16.5 3.1 -1.1 -18.9
cλ = .8 34.9 36.7 25.0 17.2 18.0 4.9 10.6 10.8 -4.5
24
Table 5: Moments of Prior and Posterior Distributions on θ
Prior mean Prior std.
dev.
Posterior
mean
Posterior
std. dev.
µλ 0.110 0.051 0.088 0.037
µρ 0.110 0.051 0.092 0.038
cλ 0.449 0.261 0.299 0.240
cρ 0.450 0.260 0.253 0.222
ψ (corr) 5.5 (0.49) 2.6 (0.13) 5.3 (0.48) 2.6 (0.13)
Death rate 0.207 0.062 0.174 0.015
Number of Observations: 224
Note: Moments are estimated from over 2,500 draws from the distribution for
birth cohorts 1960-1985.
2
Figure 1: Marginal Densities. µλ = µρ = .1, cλ = .4, cρ = .8.
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Figure 2: Joint Densities, Correlation being 0, .3 and .7, respectively.
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Figure 3: Empirical Distribution on Duration for Discovered Cartels, Co-
horts 1960-1985
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Figure 4: Posterior Density Function on θ
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